Neighbourhood policies of nations have a dynamic which differ from one another. Countries often have bitter historical experiences with their neighbours; however, there are instances of warring nations becoming cooperative neighbours. It is challenging for nations to formulate a policy which can be applied to all its neighbours without caveats. Most often, individual relations of a nation with each of its neighbours have a different historical, economic, and security underpinning; therefore, forming a single policy geared towards all the neighbours is often a counter-productive activity. Most nations have neighbourhood policies and they range from the very vague to the well-defined. With regard to India's neighbourhood policy efforts are in motion to define, articulate and delineate a policy to guide and direct India's relations with its neighbours, both immediate and those at a distance. Powerful countries have most often tried to ensure that they wield enormous influence over their smaller neighbours. They view their neighbours as their property, often interfering in their affairs with total disregard for their sovereign status. The following section will briefly survey the relations of the US, the EU, Russia and China towards their neighbours.

US-Latin American relations were largely defined by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which was formulated to prevent European involvement in the South American continent.¹ Subsequently, it was delineated further by President Theodore Roosevelt's “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, emphasizing the United States’ “right” and “responsibility” to govern the entire American Continent and President William Howard Taft's “Dollar Diplomacy”, which was designed to ensure stability in the region to promote American commercial interests. The result of such US approaches was a series of US interventions across Central America and the Caribbean.² Subsequently, the era of interventions gave way to a period of friendly engagement when the US adopted a policy of ‘Good Neighbourliness” from 1933 until after the end of the Second World War. However, as a good neighbour successive administration in Washington stopped reprimanding the dictators and did business as usual with them.

When the Cold War unfolded the US preoccupation with combating communism and communists blindfolded the American administrations to proliferation and sustenance of dictatorial regimes in Latin America. Communist/Leftists regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua were contained often with heavy costs and threat of escalation of Cold War to dangerous levels. In the post-Cold War era, the challenge to the US from its southern neighbours came when neo-liberal economic policies under the Washington Consensus were rejected by the Latin American New Left. Moreover, ideological extremism and narco-terrorism threatened US interests in the region.

However, the US domination over its neighbourhood remains unchallenged and the Monroe Doctrine remains in place. The US has ensured that its neighbourhood remains rid of great power competition. The Soviet influence in Cuba and Nicaragua during the Cold War was limited and had little spill-over effect to the detriment of vital US interests. Chinese presence in Latin America has been growing in recent years, but the US sees no writing on the wall.

Some scholars do consider the European Union (EU) as one of the Great Powers of the post-Cold War era. However, the EU is not a country, but a regional organisation. Nonetheless, on a host of international issues the EU attempts to take a unified position. The drive towards European unification by developing a common foreign and security policy has not died down even after the financial crisis the Eurozone economies has been undergoing since 2008.

Significantly, the EU by far has the most well-articulated neighbourhood policy among all countries/regional groupings. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a framework for cooperation between the EU and all its North African and Middle Eastern sea border states, the land border states of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and also the states of the Caucasus.³ The ENP aims to promote political, economic and security-related reforms in the neighbouring states. The ENP is primarily an attempt to create good neighbours, who conform to EU standards and laws.⁴ The ENP also aims to prevent new dividing lines between the EU and its neighbours.⁵

It is noteworthy that the regional integration in Europe can be described as a successful attempt by the major powers of the EU, such as Germany, France and Britain to construct a European neighbourhood that would facilitate economic growth, bring political stability and internally create a strategic community. The Eurozone crisis has thrown open internal differences in the EU and some analysts have pondered over the longevity of this institution, but none is ready yet to write an obituary. The fact that the EU has had the ENP policy is more than just symbolic. The EU as a unified international actor has defined its neighbourhood and has sought an approach that would insulate it from political and other turbulence in the neighbourhood.

Russia's policies towards its ‘Near Abroad’, which consists of the fourteen other republics which were formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, have been viewed as overpowering and forceful. They signify Moscow's unwillingness to treat the former Soviet Republics as independent and sovereign. Russian policies have been geared towards ensuring that it remains the most powerful and influential player in the domestic and external matters of the countries in its ‘Near Abroad’ and views any involvement of other actors in these nations with suspicion.⁶ This Russian approach is strikingly similar to America's Monroe Doctrine that viewed with suspicion external powers’ intervention in the hemispheric affairs.

Several independent countries occupying the former Soviet space have been deeply suspicious of the Russian design and have attempted to align their policies with the policies of the United States and its European allies. Desire of these countries for membership in the US-led NATO or the European Union has been guided by the consideration of reducing the Russian clout over their policies— internal as well as external.

Russia undoubtedly seeks to create a neighbourhood that is shielded from American or European interferences. It views with disdain and anger the projects of NATO and EU expansions to its door step. To do this, Russia plays all its cards, particularly the energy card, to put its neighbours in place. Most of the Central Asian Republics continue to have entangled economies with Russia. The gas and oil pipelines from these countries largely move through the Russian territory. Similar is the case with Ukraine. Ukrainian attempts to move closer towards the West in recent months raised the cost of hostility with Russia to such an extent that it had to lose Crimea— a strategic city along the Black Sea. Events in Georgia, Ukraine and several other issues in the former Soviet space make Russia's Near-Abroad a potentially renewed Cold War arena. Russian political and strategic behaviour is not much different from that of the former Soviet Union that carved out a different neighbourhood in Eastern Europe during the Cold War era. Fearful of Western advances, Russia gives priority of place to erect a strategic fort around it. In addition, Russia's neighbourhood policy combines soft and hard power and its engagement with the other fourteen republics stems from the Russian view of itself as one among the most influential and indispensable poles in a multi-polar world.⁷

Maintaining good relations with its neighbouring states has always been considered by the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) as a major part of its foreign policy interests.⁸ However, in reality, China through its post-World War II history has flexed its muscles against its neighbours. By doing this, China sought to expand its territory on the basis of its disputed historical claims. Secondly, China also sought to counter American influence and containment strategy by extending its support to neighbouring countries. China thus militarily-controlled Tibet soon after the Communist Revolution; it flexed its military muscles against Taiwan by occupying certain islands in the Taiwan Strait; supported North Korea against the US-led UN forces during the Korean War, and backed the communist forces in Indo-China during the prolonged Vietnam War partly to prevent spread of American control and influence in the neighbourhood and partly to extend its own influence. China attacked non-aligned India and captured its territory and fought against the Soviet forces as well along the Usuri River in 1969. In other words, China's approach to its neighbourhood was marked by its suspicion of external powers, desire to extend its territorial sovereignty and its willingness to resort to war to achieve its goals. China's dealing with its neighbourhood began to reflect its stated policy only since the institution of its acclaimed reforms in late 1970s in the aftermath of Sino-American detente and complete rift in its relationship with the former Soviet Union. The policy of reform carried out under Deng Xiaoping's leadership emphasized pursuing stable relationships with the neighbours as a necessary strategy for China's economic development.⁹ As early as 1993, then Chinese Premier Li Peng noted that his government was interested in developing friendly relations with neighbouring states, thereby laying the foundation of China's current “Good Neighbour Policy”.¹⁰

When Chinese economy galloped ahead and brought enormous wealth, power and influence to Beijing, scholars around the world began to view China's rise as a potential challenge to the existing US-led world order. The era marking the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of a unipolar world also witnessed the emergence of China as the new power and gave rise to the China Threat theory. In order to keep its economic miracle intact, China then began to attempt countering the China Threat Theory by propounding China's Peaceful Rise Doctrine and Harmonious World Doctrine.

Assertive behaviour by China in the South China Sea and its claims over the disputed islands has led to the rise of acrimonious relations with its neighbours. Dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Island has threatened to spiral out of hand and generate armed conflict. China's relations with Vietnam and the Philippines have soured over disputed claims of sovereignty and Chinese occupation of islands and reefs. China's relations with India too have occasionally turned tense largely due to violation of the Line of Actual Control by the PLA and Beijing's proclivity towards issuing maps showing vast disputed areas as part of China. While China's neighbourhood is by and large peaceful, tension has mostly arisen by Chinese offensive behaviour.

Chinese neighbours, barring a few, such as Pakistan, are weary of China's emerging assertiveness. Economic prosperity has enabled China to strengthen and modernize its military as well. In the backdrop of these developments, Chinese assertive behaviour has threatened the credibility of “peaceful rise” propaganda. The new Chinese leadership headed by Xi Jinping has become alert to this phenomenon and apparently has been trying to stem the tide. Among its most recent endeavours to offset anxiety among its neighbours, a high level meeting dedicated to Periphery Diplomacy was held in 2013. In addition, China's new “maritime silk road” plan includes close cooperation with neighbours. The ”maritime silk road” concept emerged during Chinese President Xi Jinping's first trip to Southeast Asia in October 2013. The proposal called for increased maritime cooperation between China and the ASEAN countries.¹¹

Thus it has been found that Great Powers always try to keep their neighbourhood shielded from outside influences as much as possible. Unlike during the days of colonialism and spheres of influences, it is not possible in the current age of globalization for Great Powers to insulate their neighbourhood from external influences. In fact, smaller neighbours have always been found to look for external help against a regional Hegemon. The result is a troubled and unsettled neighbourhood, as can be seen in the region surrounding China and Russia. The Latin American story is slightly distinct, because of its peculiar geography. The differentials in economy, political cohesion and military strength is so much inclined in favour of the United States that no regional power or a combination of them have been in a position for about two centuries to robustly challenge the American Hegemony. Attempts by outside powers to make inroads into this region have failed in the past and most likely Chinese efforts to face up to the American hegemony will also crash. The European neighbourhood has its own uniqueness. International challenges and difficulties are so much within the European Union that the priority goes to upholding the Union than to develop a common foreign and security policy, including the one towards the neighbourhood. Even then, the EU has tried to use its soft power of economic aid and humanitarian assistance to create a neighbourhood that would post least threat to Europe. It has succeeded to some extent, but the perception that the US ultimately directs the EU national security policy by dint of its domineering presence in NATO has circumscribed Brussels’ ambition to have an independent foreign and security policy.

Unlike the US, Russia, the EU and China, India is a late comer to the club of global powers. Only recently, India's unprecedented economic growth combined with its decision to become a full fledged nuclear weapon power altered the image of India as a fast emerging global player. Indo-US strategic partnership, India's membership in the multilateral institutions and processes of the Asia Pacific, India's role in BRICS and G 20 all indicated that India was no longer a plain and simple developing country championing the cause of the Group of 77.

However, Indian leaders from the very inception of Indian independence did have a notion of neighbourhood. Although the conception of neighbourhood changed from time to time with the evolution of Indian foreign policy with the passage of time, Indian scholarly community periodically did continue their deliberations. Significantly, India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's idea of neighbourhood encompassed all of Asia. His policy towards Asia included shouldering the role and responsibilities of the region, leading the anti-colonial strug-gles, creating a buffer of ‘Third World’ states and collaborating with China to free Asia of superpower rivalry.¹² Nehru had identified Asia as the region where India could play an important role in the post-colonial phase of international politics. He convened the first ever Asian Relations Conference a few months before India achieved her independence and a second one about two years after independence. However, spread of Cold War in Asia, India-Pakistan tension over Kashmir, Sino-Indian differences over border and host of other developments made it difficult for Nehru and his successors to keep Asia in the framework of neighbourhood to shape Indian foreign policy.

As of today, there is no clear enunciation or demarcation of its “neighbourhood” by India. But Indian foreign policy approaches from time to time did indicate that Indian leadership was very much keen to have a distinct policy towards the neighbours. At times, India's strategic neighbourhood is identified as the area extending from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits, and at other times the countries immediately bordering India, also identified as the ‘first circle’, have been mentioned as India's neighbours in the Government Reports.¹³ India's relationship with her close neighbours, namely Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka have been rather chequered. These countries, along with India form the Indian sub-continent. Inclusion of Afghanistan in SAARC has extended the territory of India's immediate neighbourhood, while exclusion of Myanmar still makes it ill-defined.

Instead of a coherent regional policy, India's bilateral interests and conflicts shaped Nehru's South Asia policy. It is difficult to fault Nehru, since the very geographical reality has made India share its border with all South Asian countries with no other two countries having contiguous border with each other. Consequently, Nehru had to follow a policy of bilateralism rather than adopt a coherent regional policy. Although India's pre-eminence in almost every aspect of elements of power theoretically could have allowed New Delhi to announce its concept of neighbourhood and discouraged unhealthy interferences by external actors in this region, the ground realties were starkly different. Nehru's idealism, Pakistan's acute hostility, Cold War politics and China's unwillingness to go along with Nehru's vision of a truly independent Asia came on the way. Certain dominant themes dictated India's approach towards its neighbours. With Pakistan, the Kashmir question remained the overriding contention, relations with China was anything but reciprocal, and India's policy towards Bhutan and Nepal was shaped by India's threat perceptions. The Tamil minority issue in Sri Lankan considerably influenced its bilateral relations with India.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's rule witnessed the formulation of a more-defined South Asia policy. Unlike her father, Indira Gandhi was forceful in handling India's relations with the South Asian neighbours. Her policies, owing to their seemingly compelling nature and bearing near-hegemonic impulses were commented upon as the ‘India Doctrine’ (some even called it the Indira Doctrine),¹⁴ a ‘Brahmanic Framework of Power’¹⁵ or a ‘Regional Monroe Doctrine’.¹⁶ Indira Gandhi's decision to counter America's friendly overtures towards China and Pakistan, apparently signalling the emergence of a hostile axis of power, by being cosy with the former Soviet Union and then fully backing the Bengali nationalists to form a new and independent country sent clear pointers about India's rising power in the immediate neighbourhood. This was cemented further by India's first nuclear test in 1974, close on the heels of division of Pakistan in 1971. These assertive policies apparently provoked fear among next-door states about Indira Gandhi's ambitions in the neighbourhood.

The Janata Government, which came to power in 1977 after defeating Indira Congress, advocated comparatively an accommodative policy towards the neighbours. India signed a five-year river water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh in 1977. Agreements on trade, cultural exchanges and communication were signed with Pakistan in 1979.¹⁷

But the Janata experiment was short-lived. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought new challenges to Indian foreign policy in its neighbourhood. Although the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had led to unprecedented security cooperation between the two countries, Soviet troops in Afghanistan was not perceived as a healthy development. In the backdrop of this development, Indira Gandhi returned to power in the 1980 general elections in India. Mrs. Gandhi's pro-Soviet proclivities were well known and thus there was certain amount of apprehensions in India's neighbourhood when she returned to power with thumping majority in the Parliament. It has been observed that Rajiv Gandhi's strategies towards the neighbouring states mirrored those practised by Indira Gandhi.¹⁸ India under Rajiv Gandhi intervened in Sri Lanka in 1987. Subsequently, the Indian navy launched the Operation Cactus to avert a coup in Maldives in 1988.¹⁹ He adopted a muscular approach to teach Nepal a lesson when the latter turned anti-India. Such a brawny neighbourhood policy led some analysts to suggest that Rajiv Gandhi was a Bonaparte in the making.²⁰

The history of India's engagement in its neighbourhood is marked by fire-fighting or negligence. Short rule by weak coalitions under the V.P Singh government or Chandrasekhar government had little appetite for charting out innovative foreign policies. Thus when the next stable government led by P.V. Narasimha was formed, India was ready for a ground-breaking initiative. Unfortunately, it said little about India's close neighbours and sought deeper engagement with countries beyond South Asia. Rao's government was responsible for fashioning the “Look East Policy”, closer ties with the only superpower of the time, the USA, and establishing diplomatic ties with Israel.²¹ The Look East policy was launched to increase eco-nomic integration with Southeast Asia. The second phase, which began in 2003, extended the coverage of the Look East Policy from South West Pacific to East Asia.²² Although Rao's government adopted a hands-off attitude towards countries of the Indian subcontinent, it was regarded by some as a departure from the previous administrations’ “interventionist approaches”.²³ However, there was a silver lining, as India's notion of neighbourhood got extended beyond the sub-continent.

Quite unlike the other short-duration Prime Ministers, Inder Kumar Gujral pioneered a novel approach towards the immediate neighbours of India. The Gujral Doctrine declared that India would pursue a policy of “…asymmetric concessions towards, and non-interference in, the affairs of India's smaller neighbours”.²⁴ In return the neighbours were to refrain from allowing “…their territories to be used in a manner contrary to Indian interests, and settle all disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations^”.²⁵ The Gujral government did not last long enough to be able to sustain this doctrine.²⁶ Gujral has got considerable kudos for such an initiative that appeared to some as quite long-sighted and strategic move. However, the beginning of a mini-economic miracle during the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) rule under Atal Behari Vajpayee's leadership finally led India to look much beyond its immediate periphery and visualize an expanded neighbourhood for furthering Indian interests. Lack-luster performance of SAARC and enhanced economic profile of India were partly responsible for re-defining India's neighbourhood.

From the Vajpayee government onwards, the concept of “extended neighbourhood” began to appear in government documents. Prime Minister Vajpayee continued to pursue the Look East policy and described East Asia as India's “extended neighbourhood”.²⁷ At the same time, credit must be given to Vajpayee for not ignoring the close neighbours and pursuing the Gujral Doctrine. More significantly, he floated the idea of a South Asian Union based on the European model. In addition, during his administration, a new regional concept of Southern Asia concept was wildly articulated in the academic circles.. The Southern Asia concept was delineated India's regional ambitions in an area consisting of West, Central, and Southeast Asia, and also underlined the BJP's aspirations for India's future global role.²⁸ The Vajpayee government also made “…a departure from the traditional aversion to the United States’ involvement in its neighbourhood…” and endeavoured to strengthen relations with the US which materialized into a new strategic partnership. The US and India then began mutual consultations on a range of security issues including “the management of the political instability in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh”.²⁹ The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government succeeded the NDA government and as part of its policy towards the neighbouring countries attempted to increase connectivity in the Indian subcontinent. It emphasized its desire to expand intra-regional trade and promote “social development and regional economic integration” in South Asia.³⁰ The complexity involving India's relations with the close neighbours is well known. Efforts to promote regional developmental initiatives could really frustrating at times. Thus the UPA began to give priority to issues beyond the immediate neighbourhood, which included establishing relations with extra-regional organs like the EU, BRICS, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO), as well as major powers; this prevented it from solving contentions in South Asia. ³¹

Due to continuities in the policies of the NDA and UPA governments, a Vajpayee-Manmohan Doctrine has also been identified, which includes “…a prioritisation of the country's economic development, an emphasis on diplomacy, a strict maintenance of Indian sovereignty, a distrust of alliances, a consideration of balances of power, an abstention from direct interference in the internal affairs of other states, and a willingness to bilaterally engage all states, including those with competing interests”.³² These policies broadly underlie India's attempt to define a neighbourhood beyond its immediate littoral states.

India's extended neighbourhood concept began to be used by Indian governments after 1998, as a notion which implied countries and regions beyond India's immediate littoral nations.³³ With the rise of India's stature, both strategically and economically in global politics, the extended neighbourhood concept can be viewed as an effort by the Indian government to “…break out of the claustrophobic confines of South Asia”.³⁴ India's extended neighbourhood concept has been a way to break free of a sub-continental mindset.³⁵ The extended neighbourhood notion which implies the areas eastwards, southwards, northwards and westwards of India, has been called an omnidirectional “360-degree vision” of the opportunities available to India.³⁶ By 2004 the Indian government was affirming the concept of an extended neighbourhood for India which “…stretches from the Suez Canal to the South China Sea and includes within it West Asia, the Gulf, Central Asia, South-East Asia, East Asia, the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.”³⁷

Towards the south, India's extended neighbourhood covered the Indian Ocean.³⁸ The 2001 Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs pointed out that “…India's security environment extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east… to the Equator in the south”; which rendered it necessary for the Indian navy to safeguard the Indian Ocean.³⁹ By expanding its southern horizons to cover the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean, India intended to “…deter hostile powers from operating against India, to maintain SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) for general trade and particularly energy supplies, and to project India's general presence and power.”⁴⁰ India's eastwards neighbourhood was characterized by India's Look East Policy.⁴¹ It was initially aimed at strengthening India's relations with the ASEAN neighbours. India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1992, a member of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) in 1995, and a full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1996. India has also become a founding member of the East Asia Summit. India's Look East Policy Phase-II has signalled the next stage of India's eastwards neighbourhood expansion.⁴² This phase “…is characterised by an expanded definition of ‘East’”, which includes Australia and New Zealand.⁴³ It also includes countries of East Asia.⁴⁴ India's northwards expansion of its neighbourhood covered the countries of Central Asia, thereby bringing India as yet another player in the brewing New Great Game over the hydrocarbon reserves of these countries.⁴⁵ It was noted by Prime Minister Vajpayee that “…with the countries of Central Asia becoming independent, a new geopolitical reality, of great significance to us, has come into being in this part of the world after the end of the Cold War, ” in which “India wishes to strengthen her ties with all the countries of the region.”⁴⁶ The westwards expansion of India's neighbourhood covered countries of West Asia. A formal Look West policy was announced in 2005 which emphasized greater cooperation with the Arab countries. India-Iran links are enshrined in the 2003 New Delhi Declaration and Road Map to Strategic Cooperation.⁴⁷

Trade, energy, security and military concerns have so far been identified as underpinning India's extended neighbourhood framework. Additionally, the India- Pakistan hostility in South Asia has spilled over into the wider extended neighborhood into Central Asia, West Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia^” and, by implication, it has become a key concern for expanding India's vision of ‘neighbourhood”.⁴⁸ More significantly, China's growing presence and rising influence in India's immediate and extended neighbourhood has also alerted Indian strategic planners and analysts and this factor has become one of the underlying reasons for India's vigorous diplomatic overtures.⁴⁹

Most major powers have developed their respective concept of “neighbourhood” that plays a vital role in their foreign and national security policies. India is now at the cusp of an economic and strategic transformation that makes it imperative for the India policy makers to construct a feasible concept of neighbourhood. It would bring clarity to national goals and foreign policy objectives. India's conceptualization of its neighbourhood has undergone several changes. Initially it included only the adjacent neighbours consisting of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, but subsequently has been expanded to embrace vast swaths of land and water lying much beyond these six nations.

India's relations with the countries in its proximate neighbourhood have been enormously challenging. Similar has been the cases with other major powers. But India's woes in handling difficult issues with neighbours are derived from some of its internal weaknesses and interferences by external powers. India's soft power has not been successfully employed to build a positive image of India among our neighbours. Most of our immediate neighbours view India with apprehension, especially with regard to its strategic intentions in the region. India's policies towards them have been seen as an admixture of accommodation, confrontation, conflict and cooperation, which lends India's approach a schizophrenic quality, making it difficult for the neighbours to anticipate India's possible strategic moves towards them during eruption of thorny issues, which in turn renders their reactions with an unpredictable quality.

A host of unsettled issues complicate the relations of India with its immediate neighbours; these include and are not limited to border disputes, managing trans-boundary rivers and transit access. India has managed to establish economic ties and connectivity with some of its immediate neighbours. Nonetheless, given India's comparatively larger economy and more powerful military, suspicions about Indian intent remain in each of these states. Another major issue which complicates India's relations with its immediate neighbours is that of non-state actors alleged to be anti-India and hiding in safe havens in these states. Terrorists, insurgents and militants who pose serious threats to India are known to have roots in some of these neighbouring states. Although, most of the governments in these states cooperate with India in flushing out these extremist groups, allegations of half-heartedness in their efforts are quite credible, which in turn add hostility to the overall relationship. Issues of drug and human trafficking, environmental and economic refugees and climate change are other serious issues India faces with its South Asian. These issues render it cumbersome for India to frame a holistic neighbourhood policy without taking into consideration the views and considerations of the neighbouring states in question.

Apprehensions of Indian actions and intentions are rampant among South Asian neighbours. Perceived hegemonic impulses and actions of India in the past has led to distrust among the neighbours and policy makers will have to find a mechanism to reduce the trust gap, while forming a neighbourhood policy. The various levels and types of economic, military, political formations in the South Asian State Systems also set hurdles in India's endeavours to chart out a clear neighbourhood policy.

Taking cue from how China, Russia, the EU and the US have managed their neighbourhood strategies it is clear that a neighbourhood signifies a region which is of extreme interest to a nation, an area where harmony and cooperation is favoured, an area which fulfils their strategic intentions and a region where other powers’ involvement should be minimal to non-existent. India's construction of a neighbourhood must aim at fulfilling the above-mentioned goals.

It is pertinent to note that China which is India's one of the most proximate neighbours does not figure prominently in either India's immediate or extended neighbourhood concepts. Instead India's neighbourhood discourses have included areas like Japan which lie beyond China. Overlooking China in formulating its neighbourhood policy does not amount to smart diplomacy for India. China is a close neighbour of India's, and several contentious issues remain to be solved between the two nations. These include matters relating to the demarcation of the border and managing river water among other issues. Sino-Indian relations provide both human security and national security challenges, rendering it pertinent for both nations to engage each other constructively to solve them. India's neighbourhood conceptualization should include a strong China component to make it viable.

India's extended neighbourhood concept provides a large mantle for India to manoeuvre. This concept signifies India's ability and motivations to maintain constructive cooperation with nations beyond its near neighbourhood, which is also a way of showcasing its rising power status to the world. The addition of the “Indo-Pacific” region into India's vision of a region that would be vital to achieve the Indian aspirations is a novel development.

By enunciating its extended neighbourhood concept India essentially has delineated the region which it considers as strategically significant for it, thereby signalling to the other major powers the ascent in India's status, reach and prominence in world affairs. The vast expanse which spans in all directions with India at its centre, which has been marked off as its extended neighbourhood, contain immense stretches of land touching Asian, African and Australian continents as well as water bodies of the South China Sea, East China Sea, Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. It constitutes an alternate way of looking at the political structuring of the globe with India as the cynosure of all affairs. The structural changes in the Indian foreign policy discourse provide the evidence of India's emergence as a state to reckon with in global politics. Taken to its logical conclusion, it will contribute to a revision of the dominant perspectives of looking at the strategic map of the world.

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