Present NDA Government, coming into power after May 2014 election, despite being a coalition of different political parties, is basically a government dominated by one party (BJP) and more precisely its Prime Minister Narendra Modi acquiring role of key policymaker for both domestic and foreign affairs. This change of Government is being perceived as departure in two ways: first, it is not a coalition government of that kind where its partners/allies are in a position to detract its foreign policy decisions or they can work as roadblock in the operationalization of its foreign affairs. Secondly, it is basically a government formed on the premises of anti-congress party thrust and orientations, hence its foreign relations are bound to have some departures in its policy orientations if not in terms of contents, than at least in its outlooks. Therefore, it is inevitable that ideology and vision of BJP, especially of its Prime Minister Modi, is going to be the sole determining factor in India's foreign relations with outside world. However, it is equally true that it is very difficult to ascertain how much Narendra Modi's personal thinking may influence foreign policy decision is a matter of debate. It is a well known fact that, in the making and implementation of foreign affairs, role of individual political elite is always minuscule as foreign policies are more governed by rational factors than by emotive impulses of individuals. Besides, in a democratic set up like India, foreign policy is determined more by domestic and external milieu with a focus on realization of national interests of the country. However, in a limited sense political leadership can influence the foreign affairs by providing some directions through their emphasis on certain issues and perspectives toward outside world. Hence, evaluation of present Government's foreign policy, especially Prime Minister Narendra Modi's pro-active approach, is not only essential but also inevitable.

Before Modi's foreign policy orientations are analyzed it is equally pertinent to understand the changing contours of India's foreign policy in the post-cold war global scenario, because the latter has changed the international environment in a substantial manner. Without understanding the backdrop of last two decades of global transformations, it will be very difficult to analyze contemporary trends of India's foreign policy. During this period two major trends can be clearly noticed: (i) end of cold war; and, (ii) initiation of the process of globalization. Undoubtedly India cannot remain exception to these twin changes. As a result, apart from general objectives in the changed context, two major thrusts of its foreign policy goals can be seen as departure from its earlier orientations. These are: first, in the form of its following of policy of pragmatism;¹ and second, India's quest for acquisition of status of major power in the community of nations.².

Pragmatism in India's foreign policy can be ascertained from the fact that policies of idealism and ethical values adhered through the third world leadership, by playing an active role in the NAM during cold war era, have been replaced by its assertive approach to attain power status through its nuclear power realization and aligning itself with the USA explicit in terms of its ‘military–to– military’ cooperation. Simultaneously efforts are being made to get a permanent seat in the UNSC. Even earlier policies of bilateralism and multilateralism have been replaced by new orientations in the form of ‘strategic partnerships’ with major powers. New economic re-alignments are being pursued to suit the changing need of globalization in the international scenario. The very purpose of this pragmatism is not to carry forward the earlier arguments for peace, disarmament and equalitarian and just world order devoid of exploitation, hegemony and dominance in global politics, rather it is aimed at to attain acknowledgement for itself as a power of consequence in the community of nations. For realizing this aim, India is making efforts in the direction of enhancing its hard power potential; soft power diplomacy; and, demonstrative capabilities to attain its foreign policy goals. Therefore, its re-alignments with powers; evolving strategic partnerships; attainment of nuclear power status; enhanced energy resources through civil-nuclear deal; effort to get UNSC seat etc. are efforts in this direction. So foreign policy of new regimes is bound to be influenced by these broad objectives India is pursuing since 1991. However, new foreign policy outlooks cannot be designated without acknowledging the continuity of its recent past as there has not been much ideological differences between the present government and earlier regimes on broad foreign policy goals.

Though it is very early to comment on what is going to be the orientations of India's foreign policy of new regime, yet from Modi's Nani A. Palkivala Memorial lecture at Chennai(18 October 2013);³ his speeches during election campaign; his speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (29 September 2014);⁴ BJP's election Manifesto;⁵ and his pro-active policy initiatives with major powers reflected through his visits to Japan, USA and Australia and visits of Presidents of China and Russia to India provide a clue for broad trends to be followed by this government. At the outset, however, it can be ascertained that Modi's foreign policy vision is likely to be influenced by three fold compulsion: (a) legacies and initiatives of Vajpayee Government; (b) ideological moorings of BJP and its founder organization, i.e. RSS; and, (c) developmental agenda being propagated by Modi in the form of ‘Gujarat model’. If Modi's speeches after the formation of Government are analyzed, then it becomes categorical clear that his emphasis has always been to follow up the principles and initiatives pursued by the earlier NDA Government under Atal Behari Vajpayee. As a result, at all three levels- bilateral, regional, and global – present Government is likely to consider Vajpayee Government's initiatives as guidelines for its foreign policy. Besides, ideological moorings of its party, i.e. rightist orientation, are also going to accelerate the process of globalization as hallmark of its foreign policy goals. As a result, unlike earlier UPA regime, present Government may adept more focused approach and strong inclination towards the neoliberal economic agenda. Simultaneously, Modi's continued emphasis on developmental agenda as a keyword for his Government; it is obvious that its foreign policy outlook is likely to be influenced by new geo-economic realities. Therefore, Modi's foreign policy can be understood in terms of following imperatives.

Dynamism in global politics and regional and bilateral constrains are not going to provide smooth sailing for the realization of Modi's foreign policy goals. Despite India's relatively improved power status and its pro–active approach, foreign policy attainments are more likely to be circumscribe with numerous limitations in the time to come.

1. First and foremost problem it is likely to face will be from its neighbours because relations of India with its neighbours had a long turbulent history. Prolonged and multiple nature of issues involved with them have created a conflicting scenario in its neighbourhood. In case of Pakistan, despite initiation of numerous processes of Confidence-Building-Measures (CBMs) of civil and military nature, domestic politics is not allowing Nawaz Sharif to make tranquilities on its border with India. Rather current reiteration of issue like Kashmir through resolution it its assembly and also earlier at UN forum, reflect the unchanged mood of Pakistan towards improvement in its bilateral ties. Therefore, it has rightly been observed that “the structure of India-Pakistan conflict is much deeper than simple territorial or identity based explanations. There is need to go beyond the standard prescriptions…..”¹³ Similarly to resolve border issue with China is hard nut to crack. Efforts since 1988, through the working of Joint Working Group (JWG), have failed to realize the desired result. Though there are both pessimistic¹⁴ and optimistic¹⁵ analysis by the experts, yet it cannot be denied that to resolve such a complex issue within a short span is not an easy task. Besides, it becomes all the more difficult in the context of Modi's efforts towards warm ties with Japan and the USA. Moreover, emerging Indo-US goodwill during Obama's recent visit may forge China–Pakistan friendship against India in a more vehement manner. This has been very much evident in terms of Chinese and Pakistan's reaction against Obama's visit to India. Similarly to cultivate economic cooperation with other small neighbours, challenge lies for Indian diplomacy to convince them that India is an opportunity and not threat for them. Therefore, these issues are going to present different scenario for Modi's Government to handle its immediate neighborhood with delicate and skilled diplomatic maneuvering.

2. Modi's changed tactics is without the support of grand strategy to implement such foreign policy orientations. It is because foreign policy making structures are not designed to suit such requirements. As far as structures are concerned it is observed that India's foreign policy making process is deficit in terms of its long terms guidelines and strategy bereft of inputs from any research/think-tank foundation/intellectual. As a result, role of official of Indian Foreign Service persons become very vital.¹⁶ It is because important foreign policy making institutions like PMO, NSC and MEA are dominated by persons of this background. These officials, in a way, determine country's foreign policy irrespective of party affiliations of their political elites. Through their advisory role and flexible interpretations, they have significant leeway in crafting policies. Besides this, Indian Foreign service is severely understaffed. Though in August 2008 Government has created 314 new posts and cabinet also approved a 43 percent increase in the sanctioned post of IFS recruits, yet it also need an overhaul in training, as well as, creation of new research and policy division in place of historical division which was closed down long back.¹⁷ All this is a long time process. Hence, till that time present Government has to work with its day to day basis handling of its foreign affairs. Therefore impact of Modi's new foreign policy outlook and orientations may not get reflected in the execution of India's foreign relations. Moreover, this adhocism in foreign affairs may also prove a strong road block in India's long term strategy to become power of consequence in the global arena.

3. Modi's visits to Japan, US and Australia and Barack Obama's visit to India reflect the serious strategic engagements of India with larger American framework towards Asia-Pacific, on the one hand; and reflects in terms of a strategy aimed at putting restraints on China's power in Asia-Pacific; on the other hand. This in a way manifests about India's engagement in US global imperialistic design. This is reflected through India's acceptance of balance of power game plan with these states which sometimes look like ‘Making of an Asian NATO’¹⁸ India's building of relationships with Japan on the basis of ‘special strategic global partnership (Sept. 2014); with USA on the basis of ‘new and enhanced strategic partnership’ (November 2014) and ‘broad strategic and global partnership’ (January 2015); and with Australia on the basis of ‘framework for security cooperation’ (November 2014) are evidence of this changed orientation. That is why it has been rightly observed that, New Delhi has “aligned itself even more closely with Washington's imperialist agenda, and has now joined Tokyo and Canberra as the third lynchpin in the US's Pivot to Asia that aims to contain Beijing”.¹⁹ US-India Joint Statement issued after Modi's visit to Washington notes the complementarities of “India's ‘Act East’ policy and the United States rebalance to Asia” if the two “work more closely with other Asia-Pacific countries”. Both also “reaffirmed their shared interest in preserving regional peace and stability” of Asia-Pacific through “safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea”.²⁰ Thus, India, through the US support, is expanding its military presence not only in the Indian Ocean, but also in Southeast Asia, South China Sea and indeed in Central Asia. As a result, it seems that de facto military alliance system between India and these states is taking shape, which is dangerous for India's interests in two ways: one, it is going to create a wedge between India and China which will be difficult to bridge, Second, it is going to entangle India in futile arm race which may hamper its prospects to become strong economic power in future. Therefore, high risks are involved for India's policy makers if they involved in such game of power politics. Moreover, it may make the process of its border reconciliation with China more difficult.

4. To be a major power of consequence India also needs capabilities to play the role expected from a power of the stature. In terms of military power one should be capable of handling that security threats beyond one's border. It must have the power to punish its enemy through a direct and indirect attack on its installations both civilian and military. It means one must have interventionist capabilities beyond its borders. In case of India, despite its large scale conventional capabilities and possession of nuclear weapons, this kind of role is limited towards its smaller neighborhood states. Additionally, despite its strong and huge armed forces it also failed to check infiltration of its boundaries by the infiltrators from Pakistan and China. Beyond its own borders it only possess a base in Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan and that too does not allow it to play any significant military role neither to resolve crisis in Central Asian Republics(CARs), nor to control problems of instabilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. India's presence there is more of a symbolic nature rather providing a sound military backup during any crisis. In terms of economic power as well, India is far behind of the stature to be considered as major investor state or to provide economic support of a large quantity. It is capable of only strengthening the growth of economic infrastructure in smaller states like Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal and not to other neighbours in South Asia.

   As far as soft power is concerned, India has the potentials in terms of its adherence of important civilizational values of non-violence, peace, democracy etc. It is also successful in demonstrating its acceptance of UN norms, good bilateral ties with all, support for peace zones, propagating area of peace approach etc. But these values have neither been made as part of its foreign policy strategy, nor have been supported by its track record of numerous domestic conditions. Besides this, these values have not got the required attention in the debate among its policy makers as to utilize them for global transformation or to be considered as major goal for India's foreign policy strategy. Though during the present century such proclamations are visible, yet the basic consensus on such values among political elites across political spectrum and seriousness among policy planners seem to have been missing. Domestically as well India's track record of upholding democratic values in terms of human rights, corruption free, transparency, police-public relations etc. have not reached the requisite level of exemplary position for other states. Community of nations does not consider India's such stature as to become attractive for other to be emulated.

Modi's Foreign policy, thus, represents both continuity and change of the policies pursued by different regimes in the post-cold war era. Its continuity can be observed in terms of post-cold war pragmatic orientations adopted by regimes of PV Narsimha Rao, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh eras. During the post- 1991 era, there seem to have emerged a consensus across party lines regarding structural reforms, new regional alignments, look east, extended neighbourhood policy, nuclear civil deal programmes etc. Even acquisition of nuclear status can be visualized differently only in terms of its theory than practice. It is evident from the fact that there were jubilations among all political leaders about India's new capability. However, departure in terms of emphasis and changing international milieu cannot be overlooked. Modi is credited of not only defining India's national interests in more categorical manner but also to give sharp focus towards their attainment by making assertions both at domestic and international forums. Besides, his abandoning of non-alignment framework for India's foreign policy became more manifest due to his known aversion to Nehruvian world view. Earlier regimes cannot discard Nehruvian legacies openly, because of their historical and personal reasons, while such compulsions are not there with the present regime. However, visualizing his personality and support of ideological moorings, it is expected that he is likely to follow a more assertive and muscular foreign policy orientations. This is definitely going to provide surprises, if not in terms of contents, then at least in terms of tactics.

Though some experts have start visualizing his policies in terms of ‘Modi doctrine’, yet it is too early to accept such notion. Besides, successes and failures of this regimes to handle critical issues of foreign policy can be judged only by way to ascertain how India succeeds in strengthening of its economic capabilities, along with its acquisition of important space in the community of nations.

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