The notion of world order has been subjected to a multilayered and complex interpretation. The debate over its nature has intensified and the discipline of international relations seems to be divided on the issue of defining concepts such as multi polarity, hegemony, imperialism and supra-national. These concepts, in a way, have taken a back seat and the nature of world order is now being broadly understood through phenomena such as multilateral governance, complex interdependence, agenda setting and the replacement of the notion of hard power with soft power. Thus, in the scenario of a globalizing international circumstance, the very notion of world order itself has not remained as a monolithic phenomenon, with the course of international relations witnessing such kaleidoscopic transformations. This has led in the discipline of international relations, to the rise of the ‘neo/neo debate’ wherein an inconclusive triangular argument is on amongst the neo-realists, the neoliberals and the Neo-Marxists regarding the nature of the contemporary world order. The persistent debate has also led Stephen Walt to describe this state of affairs as ‘one world many theories’.¹

On account of this, serious questions have been posed in the discipline of international relations as to whether there has been the end of IR theory after the third and the fourth debate? In answering this, Tim Dunne et. al. have optimistically predicted that international relations theory may demonstrate a resilient existence as it is theory-led, theory-literate and theory-concerned.² Further, scholars like Christian Reus-Smit have challenged the argument that meta theories are out of fashion. He has argued that we can at best bracket meta theoretical enquiry but cannot completely free our work from meta-theoretical assumptions. Reus-Smit further argues that the main objective of international relations is the generation of practical knowledge and empirical theoretical insights alone cannot provide such knowledge. It has to be integrated with normative forms of reasoning that focuses on metatheoretical reflections and an expansive and ambitious eclecticism.³ Andrew Bennett on his part indicates that the organization of the discipline of international relations around the major paradigms or ‘Isms’ prominently, neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism, Marxism and feminism has been based on a flawed reading of the philosophy of science and has run its course. Hence, the study of international relations must be grounded in structured pluralism consisting of major paradigms.⁴ Finally, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt accentuate the continuing significance of theory for the discipline of international relations, as against simplistic hypothesis testing.⁵ Apart from this inter paradigm debate, the second level of concern which has been expressed pertaining to the discipline of international relations is the post-positivist critique of IR as a science.⁶ One of the most prominent offshoots of this critique has been the questioning of the very notion of international relations as the State centric discipline. With this, serious questions are also being raised regarding the validity of the State centered theories that define the nature of world order. Hence, as globalization intrudes into people's lives as a juggernaut, the need for viewing the emerging world order beyond the framework of the State becomes important. In view of this, the fundamental requirement is to interrogate the linkages between the notions of globalization and world order. It is in this perspective that the present paper seeks to understand the role of India's soft power in shaping its neighborhood policy and the setting up of a regional agenda for South Asia.

In this regard, the paper attempts at exploring the idea of South Asia and locate India in its contemporary dynamics by liberating our explanation from the structuralist and materialist logic of neo-realism. Putting this in perspective, the prominent question that is posed here is; why India's neighborhood policy has failed. Going beyond neorealist explanation, the paper seeks to answer this question by critiquing India's neighborhood policy by using the critical theory, especially the contribution of Robert Cox to the understanding of world order. For Cox, production, ideas and institutions can contribute to the transformation of the world order. It has been argued that India's neighborhood policy represents the failure to effect such a transformation which manifests in its inability to mold the regional agenda in South Asia.

India is an emerging power. This is a status that triangulates between a great power status possessing system shaping capabilities and intensions to do it and a middle power status that lacks the same. However, the size, resources and role of middle powers make them crucial actors for the dynamics of global and regional power calculus. Emerging powers like India are middle powers that are rapidly acquiring system shaping capabilities and have also displayed their intensions toward catapulting to the great power status. In other words, India is not a great power, but it has the potential to emerge as one.⁷ For powers like India, the region of their location becomes their sway of influence.⁸

However, India has lacked the capability to shape regional dynamics, despite its enormous hard power exercised through tangible resources consisting of stable political institutions, strong economy and superior defense capacity. Thus, although India dominates the region, its domination is contested. Apart from this, India's poor socio-economic indicators have been a major hindrance. This shortcoming has also limited the use of India's soft power which is exercised indirectly by setting up an agenda to which other neighbors in the region follow without being coerced to do the same. Due to India's inability to exercise a co-optive power behavior by making its neighbors agree to the ideas and political agenda mooted by it and determine their preferences, India has failed to strengthen its claims to be an emerging power. Soft power is always exercised through intangible resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. However, India has been unable to exercise its soft power despite its marked advantages of development, as compared to its neighbors and because of this, has also failed to shape the regional interests in accordance to its own agenda. This has considerably undermined its upward mobility in the global calculus of power.

The key reasons for such state of affairs have been India's entanglement in cartographic disputes with neighbors pertaining to borders, river water sharing and migration. Anyhow, contemporary international relations have moved beyond State-centric connotations and now manifests in the postmodern structures characterized by multilateral governance and soft borders. Socio-economic and cultural issues form the crucial component of such a trajectory of international relations. Now, its contours do not represent a monadic focus on the State and exhibit a dyadic interplay between the State and other multiple forces. However despite this multilayered fabric of international relations, South Asia still is entrenched in the trappings of modern Westphalian system in terms of the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Securitizing of physical threats to territoriality and war-making for the defence of the same still constitutes part of the core agenda of the region's States. The interests of South Asian States in this count have been primarily defined in terms of cartographic fundamentalism which is guided by the cardinal principle of safeguarding sovereignty and fixity of political territoriality.

South Asia in this sense has been mired in the structuralist and materialist logic of a neorealist international order. In such a scenario, the choices and policy options for India have also been factored deeply by the neorealist paradigm. If we look at the chronology of last one year, the security predicament that the Indian subcontinent has been experiencing, apparently demonstrates this phenomenon. The stalled Indo-Pak dialogue process and SAARC's inability to arrive at consensus on crucial developmental issues such as energy and transport, indicates toward the weak role of India in shaping the regional agenda. India's position here is specifically highlighted because among the SAARC countries, it is the most developed nation comprising of a vast amounts of diverse resources that include a considerable size of qualified man power, a large production capacity and most crucially an advanced State construction process resulting in the establishment of a wide array of institutions. To put this in Coxian terms, India possesses all the three attributes mentioned by him; production, ideas and institutions necessary to shape the agenda of international relations. However, India has been unable to take advantage of such capabilities and South Asia's developmental trajectory remains very sluggish. To understand such a precarious situation, we need to examine the nature of our region and then situate our explanation of South Asia in the context of the changing course of international relations theory. This exercise is essential because the global trend of contemporary international relations is reflected in the different theoretical debates posed by scholars of the discipline of international relations. Situating our understanding in the framework of the current inter-paradigm debate, we may arrive at a practical knowledge of the ontology and epistemology of South Asia which include empirical theoretical insights, normative reasoning and analytical eclecticism. Thus, here a kind of structured pluralism will be adopted to understand India's neighborhood policy in South Asia.

The term region, commends a multifaceted epistemological place in International Relations. The interpretation of its nature crisscrosses an intricate and multi-layered path and tends to resist any monolithic envisionment. However, for the purposes of a wider discourse, a region may be seen as being characterized by a closely knit and innate geographic proximity among its units, common history, cultural homogeneity and intense interaction among the units. To conceptualize as to what region is all about, the Regional Security Complex Theory developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever could be adopted. This theory is grounded in the problem of understanding, confronted by IR scholars while engaging in the interpretation of the transformed pattern of security in the wake of the end of cold war. RSCT is framed by arriving at arguments that are based on the triangulation of three conceptions of the post-cold war international security structure. They are the neorealist, the globalist and the regionalists. Buzan and Waever in their formulation of the regional security complex theory, critique the State-centricism and the materialist logic of the distribution of global power, the balance of power logic and the structure of international security, put forth by neorealism. Instead, they emphasize the non-materialist conception of security, embedded in the constructivist discourse, with a thrust on locating the nature of international security at the global sub systemic level or the regions. RSCT also critiques the globalist position of international security which is rooted in the notions of globalization and which challenges the Statist and power political understanding of the international system structure, as advocated by neorealism.

The globalization approach seeking to understand the international security structure is divided into two distinct strands. The Marxist perspective argues that the concern pertaining to the practice of economic liberalism is a key to understand the wider international security agenda.⁹ They affirm that the center-periphery structure of international political economy is accelerated by globalization which tends to maintain the vulnerabilities of the periphery in a manner to facilitate the strengthening of the position of the core. As a counterpoint to this is the liberal approach which acknowledges the existence of inequalities and disparities but assert that globalization is the only process through which these inadequacies may be rapidly and effectively mitigated. In this view, globalization should be a path to the steady erosion and eventual elimination of the traditional international security agenda and more radically, the State also. The key point of RSCT's critique of the globalization perspective is that in the 1990s, it generated a more explicitly military-political securitization in the process creating an interesting conjuncture between itself and some strands of neorealist thinking. The globalization perspective argues that in the new international security structure, the center has become more cohesive and the international system much more hierarchical, an analysis that closely parallels the unipolarist thinking in neorealism.¹⁰ Thus, the preferred approach of RSCT is the regionalist approach.

Buzan and Waever agree that in the post-cold war world, the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for States and as a level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.¹¹ The regionalist perspective for Buzan and Waever has a post-cold war focus that is rooted in two assumptions.¹² First assumption is that the decline of the super power rivalry reduces the penetrative quality of global power in the rest of the world.¹³ The second assumption is that most of the great powers of the cold war international system are now lite powers¹⁴ which means that their domestic dynamics pull them away from military engagements and strategic competition in the troubled spots of the world, leaving the local States and societies to sort out their military political relationships with less interference from great powers than before. Buzan and Waever argue that the regional level of security was significant even during the cold war and except when global powers were extremely dominant, as in the imperial era, regional security dynamics will normally be a part of the overall constellation of the security in the international system.¹⁵ RSCT also accepts that security analysis should begin with region by employing a comparative approach and think that this idea should be applied beyond the immediate circumstances of the post-cold war period.¹⁶ The regionalist perspective contains elements of both neo-realists and globalists, but gives priority to a lower level of analysis. As both neo-realists as well as the globalist perspective are rooted in territoriality and security, Buzan and Waever see RSCT as being complimentary to the neorealist perspective on system structure in a sense, providing a fourth tier of structure. However, the regional focus and the constructivist understanding of security, places RSCT outside the neorealist project. The globalists on the other hand emphasize on de-territorialization which contradicts the territorialist thrust of RSCT.¹⁷

Hence, for Buzan and Waever,¹⁸ understanding of the levels is the key for painting the portrait of the global security structure. With a thrust on the regionalist approach, they tend to draw from a combination of all the three perspectives, by complimenting them with a historical overview. Picking up from this overview, Buzan and Waever divide the history of regional security complexes into three stages. First is modern Europe from 1500 to 1945, cold war and decolonization from 1945 to 1989 and the post-cold war period since 1990.¹⁹ It is during this period that the first global scale international system came to being, coalesced by the spreading of the European model of sovereign territorial State.²⁰ The twin phenomenon of the rise of a global international system and the popularization of the European-style of territorial State, provided the impetus for the emergence of RSCs. This happened as States became the principle players in the international security structure in an international system of the global scale. This transformation created space for the rise of different regional security subsystems. Hence, as the global security system began to be dominated by a few great powers whose influence reached far flung areas, there was the simultaneous budding of regional security subsystems, whose security focus was in their immediate neighborhood. However, till 1945, the RSCs had not fully developed and the global system was heavily tilted towards the great powers. It thus paved the way for the rise of European colonial empires. In this period according to Buzan and Waever,²¹ the notion of regional security was defined initially in terms of great power rivalries and then by security interdependence among local units. This is the period in which the European international system became global.

In the second stage of the history of RSCs that spans from 1945 to 1989 according to Buzan and Waever, cold war and decolonization brought contradictory effects. At one end of the spectrum, decolonization led to the decline of imperial power and the rise of numerous new States, resulting in the operationalization of regional security dynamics among them. Contrary to this, the bipolar international security structure created by the ideological rivalry between the US and USSR, paved the way for the subordination of much of Europe and Asia and the penetration of the sway of super powers into the security domains of many decolonized States. The decolonized spaces of the third world during the cold war emerged as suitable grounds to stage super power rivalries, hence leading to the formation of several regional security complexes. These RSCs were being operated by the dynamics of cold war politics, assisted effectively by A State system modeled in the lines of European values of sovereignty and bounded territoriality. Thus by the 1960s, the whole world was politically packaged in the European manner. This drastic expansion of the international society was facilitated by the United Nations which not only provided legitimacy to the new States, but also helped the poorer and weaker States with a range of diplomatic services to strengthen their position in the global society of States.²²

The third stage of the history of RSCs beginning with the end of cold war in 1990 was marked by three factors. The rolling back of super power rivalry, the end of the ideological confrontation and the increased thrust towards recognizing the nonmilitary threats to security. In this epoch, the international system got divided into two worlds that is a zone of peace and a zone of conflict.²³ The zone of peace consisted of the established capitalist powers of the West and their allies, who now did not face the threat of military attack and hence their focus shifted towards the nonmilitary sources of security threats. In the zone of conflict on the other hand, the transition from the cold war to the post-cold war international system did not bring in any substantial changes and the States here still were reeling under the threats of military conflicts. This division was also characterized by a greater emphasis upon the significance of the regional security complexes, whose functioning was now expedited by the end of cold war. Hence for Buzan and Waever²⁴ decolonization opened up larger spaces for regional military-political dynamics and the end of cold war, enabled these dynamics to operate with greater freedom from high level super power military-political intrusions. Simultaneously, the growing power of the global market enabled the generation of regional security initiatives. The operation of the global market and its securitizing effects, both on the environment and on patterns of identity also took some regional focus. Thus, there was a new type of interplay between the forces of globalization on the one hand and a seemingly paradoxical but in fact connected strengthening of territorialized regional dynamics on the other.

On the basis of this, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever argue that a global order with strong regions can be conceptualized.²⁵ They begin with the contention that since decolonization, the notion of regional security has become more autonomous and prominent in international politics and the end of cold war has accelerated this entire process.²⁶ As the omnipresence of bipolarity and super power rivalry receded, regional powers gained more space for maneuverability. The major powers of this epoch also displayed little enthusiasm towards intervention in security issues outside their respective regions. Thus, the relative autonomy of regional security constitutes a pattern of security relations radically different from the rigid structure of bipolarity that defined the cold war. According to Buzan and Waeiver this pattern is not adequately captured in either the unipolar or the multipolar designations of the international system structure. Nor is it captured by the idea of globalization or the dismal conclusion that the best IR could do in conceptualizing the security order of the post-cold war is to call it the new world disorder.²⁷

Hence, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever propose the regional security complex theory to explain this new structure and to evaluate the relative balance of power of and mutual relationship within it between regionalizing and globalizing trends. RSCT distinguishes between the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance and the subsystem level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region. The central idea of RSCT is that since threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters or security complexes. Since States are concerned with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbors, the processes of securitization and the degree of security interdependence is more intense between actors inside these complexes than they are between actors inside such complexes and those outside it. Security complexes may well be penetrated by global powers, their regional dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree of autonomy from the patterns set by the global powers.²⁸

The regional security complex theory draws from the materialist epistemology of bounded territoriality and distribution of power that marks the neorealist interpretation of the structure of international relations. However, RSCT represents a departure from neorealism, in so far as its shift of emphasis from the global systemic security structure to the regional sub-systemic security structure is concerned. On the other hand, Buzan and Waever also engage with the non-materialist epistemology of the constructivist discourse in their conception of securitization which focuses on the political processes by which security gets constituted. RSCT thus breaks away from neorealism by treating the distribution of power and the pattern of amity and enmity as essentially independent variables. For them, polarity may effect, but it does not determine the character of security relations. The process of securitization is open and is subject to a host of factors. RSCT thus, offers a conceptual framework that classifies security regions into set of types.

Thus, for a comprehensive understanding of the regional security sub-system or complex, historical dynamics of amity and enmity must be considered in addition to the regional equations of power which is only partly related to the balance of power. RSCs are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global coherent patterns of security inter-dependence.²⁹ Another significant factor is that external actors have little impact upon the historical patterns of amity and enmity and then they do on the distribution of power. Indeed, they tend to acquiesce in local patterns of amity and enmity. The specific patterns of who fears whom and who likes whom is not generated by the system level and is generated internally within the region by a mixture of history, politics and material conditions.³⁰

If we problematize South Asia here, it may be argued that the transformation from colonialism to an autonomous RSC happened by the simultaneous liberation of its States in a temporary parallel. Hence, the space between the transitions from colonialism to RSC was very limited in South Asia. The RSC that emerged in the region was also characterized by inter-State rivalry, with States being involved in war with each other. Thus, as the cold war was defining an intense bipolar security structure at the global level, South Asia was structuring itself into an intense RSC. The intersection of these two levels of security dynamics also was apparent in the episodes of conflict between India and Pakistan. To understand the nature of security dynamics from the lens of RSCT, it is crucial to know the type of States that the region comprises. In this regard, RSCT holds that well advanced industrial democracies would have a different set of security dynamics than those which are still developing and underdeveloped.³¹ South Asia in this sense, must be situated in the category of a region comprising largely of underdeveloped and unstable States.

In this regard, the spectrum of week and strong States as a way of thinking about national security, can facilitate our understanding about the interplay between the types of States and the types of regional security dynamics.³² The spectrum of week/strong States here is not merely about power, but it is based on the degree of socio-political cohesion between civil society and institutions of Government.³³ In this sense, the spectrum is regarding the degree of Stateness or what Robert Jackson calls as the empirical sovereignty that a State possesses.³⁴ Based on this independent variable of Stateness, the dependent variables of week and strong States may be constructed. Thus, those States that possess greater degree of internal cohesion between civil society and institutions of Government or what is called as Stateness are strong States and locate their threat perceptions outside their borders. The States that lack this cohesion and Stateness are internally unstable, with different sub-State actors competing for their own security in turn, intensifying multiple claims and counter claims for State power. This internal fragility makes these States more vulnerable to security threats from outside. Thus, if strong States locate their security threats purely outside their borders, the security threats of weak States are situated in the interface between internal fragility of the State and the tumultuous international environment in which they are placed. This also means that a region comprising of strong States will have totally different security dynamics than a region having primarily week States. However, this is not a tight compartmentalization and exceptions may also exist.³⁵ For instance, in South Asia, India is a stronger State as compared to its weaker neighbors. Thus, it is from the perspective of a region consisting of a strong State surrounded by week States that South Asian regional dynamics must be understood. Clipped to this it is crucial to interrogate as to why despite the existence of a strong State that is India, the region has not developed as a cohesive entity wherein, the stronger State has been able to shape the international relations of the region by setting up a common agenda.

Here, the argument of regional security complex theory that to understand the historical evolution of RSCs, the question as to how types of States found in specific regions have affected the ways in which regional dynamics have unfolded must be analyzed.³⁶ Apart from the weak/strong States distinction, yet another categorization of States based upon the degree of Stateness is of the pre-modern, modern and post-modern States.³⁷ This categorization provides a broader spectrum to the weak/strong States distinction. Much of the States of the third world are categorized as pre-modern States and they are characterized by low levels of socio-political cohesion and poorly developed structures of Government. In terms of the degree of Stateness, they are weak States. Majority of such States are located in Africa. Weak States confront much vulnerability and the agenda of securitization may largely shift from State to sub State actors. Both their region of location as well as the international system in which they are embedded, shapes their security environments. In the same way, the modern States are defined in terms of the European classical Westphalian ideal types which are marked by strong Governmental control over the society. They are basically placed outside the core of advanced capitalist States. Due to their strong territoriality, modern States tend to securitize in inside outside terms. Modern States also alternate between the classification of weak and strong States which is determined by the varying degree of Stateness that they possess, meaning that there can be strong modern States as well as weak modern States. Similarly, there can be regions comprising of modern States which may be strong as well as week. South Asia represents this typology wherein, there is India which is a strong modern State and Pakistan which is a weak modern State. Finally, the postmodern States are situated largely in the capitalist core and represent the newly emerging Post-Westphalian type. They are strong States which have gone beyond traditional security concerns. Although they still possess modern qualities of cartography, sovereignty and national identity, but they tend to dissolve this for achieving larger economic and cultural openness and mutual cooperation. While doing this they have also considerably de-securitized traditional agenda of threats, they have less of the inside/outside preoccupation of the modern States, but are more concerned with the security of the structure that link postmodern States together.³⁸

The conceptual triangulation of great powers, middle powers and emerging powers in international relations may emerge as an epistemological starting point in this regard. In the context of South Asia, this conceptual triangulation may be employed to understand the status of India according to which is an emerging power. South Asian regional security complex is marked by regional security dynamics characterized by the interplay of two types of States, holding different power positions in the international system. Firstly, the region consists mainly of modern weak States, juxtaposed with an emerging modern State which is India. However, the dominant feature of South Asian regional security dynamics has been the security competition between Pakistan which is a modern weak State and India which is an emerging modern State. Such a peculiar combination may be understood with a kind of structured pluralism which may be done after examining the current interparadigm debate in the discipline of international relations.

If we look at the nature of conflict in South Asia, it appears as pathological because the image of the other is based on a distorted perception of reality, coupled with fear and suspicion. The super imposed artificial character of nation-building project comprising of imported values and institutional structures, considerably contributed to this trend. The pattern of conflict thus has been shaped by the nation-building processes, in turn marked by the colonial legacy, the structures built by the British Empire and the trauma of partition. Although external forces have exercised considerable influence upon the regional affairs, however, the political dynamics of South Asia have been largely intra-regional in character. Such introverted regional security dynamics has been part of the imperial cartography and political history, a legacy carried forward by the succeeding native ruling classes.³⁹ Now, the trajectories adopted for achieving the goals of State formation, State construction and nation-building immediately after decolonization seem to have reached the point of exhaustion. If this situation is not addressed, the crisis may lead to perilous consequences. The scaffold on which the State, economy and society was made to stand until now has come to be vigorously contested. The crisis lurks behind the super structural arrangements with its heady mix of organic and inorganic processes in the society. The institutional architecture comprising socio-economic and political structures that was put in place during the time of postcolonial transformations, failed to accomplish the goal of State construction and nation-building. Nation-building is not a linear movement; rather it is a process that has to go through maze of cross-currents before reaching some conscious conclusions.⁴⁰

South Asia has been plagued by internal conflicts that have got sustained due to the existence of inexorable socio-economic inequities. Due to its circuitous heterogeneity, the nature of conflict in the region has been marked by deeply embedded complexities. Several cross-country connections and trend towards regionalization of conflict, adverts a strong need for according a regional approach at understanding the patterns of conflicts in South Asia.⁴¹ The constant incapacity of some of the South Asian countries to manage intra-regional inter-State differences peacefully and their indulgence in hot-pursuit intermittently seems to have largely jeopardized peace, regional security and economic progress in the region. The lack of mutually acceptable frontiers among the States, the issue of river water sharing, the alarming growth of trans-border migration and cross-border terrorism and the unresolved status of diverse ethnic nationalities have cumulatively contributed to transform South Asia into a theater of conflict. The nature of conflicts in the region may be categorized into two different variants. First is the intra-State conflict that stems from the lack of social cohesion among different groups of communities that inhabit a given territorial State. Secondly, there are the inter- State conflicts that have mainly been engendered by border disputes.⁴²

The current politico-strategic pandemonium and the conflict-prone history of South Asia, thus makes a strong case in favor of speedy exploration of amicable means to untangle the region's intricate problems. This is primarily because the two nuclear powered adversaries India and Pakistan are still grappling to find amicable solutions to their long-standing disputes. With an ever increasing intensity of cross-border terrorism and the continuing inability on the part of both sides to sustain the peace process, the South Asian security architecture appears very fragile. In a nut shell, South Asia has emerged as a tinder box and the moderation of the highly charged-up atmosphere of the region has now become an exigency. Hence, adroit conflict management, speedy reduction of tension and rapid socio-economic progress, all acquire paramountcy when we visualize the current situation of the region.

The seriousness of the problem basically lies in the fact that not only authoritarian regimes, but even those regimes that have been engaged in a constant but dilettantish experimenting in democratic governance, have indulged in such activities that has had a blackball effect in accentuating the process of decadence that has pestered South Asia ever since the region got liberated from colonial fetters. In addition to this, the pressures of local geographical proximity adjacency is also potent for security.⁴³ Besides, the international system for regions like South Asia, situated in the third world, unlike that of the west is characterized by hierarchy than anarchy and their domestic space is characterized by anarchy rather than well-defined hierarchy. Third world countries face a world in which informal hierarchal realities severely restrict their freedom of action. It also generates systemic pressures upon them to fashion their behavior that complies with the interests of the powerful States. Conversely, the domestic politics of the third world is more prone to anarchy due to lack of uniform rules because of the severe constraints of rulemaking amidst highly contending forces. Owing to all this, the State in the third world countries cannot be considered to be modelled on Westphalian lines that is, a State with inviolable boundaries, a monopoly for the use of force in those boundaries and effective democratic governance.⁴⁴ This factor is further deepened in South Asia as, the super imposed administrative unity achieved under conquering dynasties or under the British Raj cannot be considered as synonymous to the various historical regional identities that have persisted in primordial form.⁴⁵

On the other hand, States of South Asia are democratizing, with the process of State construction still in the nascence. This inevitably results in violence, as most of them recently emerged out of colonial fetters and are divided on the basis of diverse linguistic, cultural and tribal identities. It has also to be noted here that in the last part of the 20^th century and at the dawn of the new millennium, there has been the globalization of South Asian security dynamics. This has been epitomized by the growing interference of outside powers in fashioning the geopolitical templet of the region. At the outset, the magnifying disquiet over the prospects of nuclear war between the two subcontinental rivals has brought in greater global activism in order to diffuse the tensions between them.

United States’ security presence has been deep and pervasive in Pakistan, Afghanistan and some central Asian countries, owing to the war on terrorism. Apart from this, The Anglo-American dyad has also aided the Governments of Sri Lanka and Nepal in their endeavors at dealing with civil wars in their polities. Besides this, Norway has also been actively involved in finding amicable ways to resolve the ethnic impasse in Sri Lanka and Britain led the international initiatives to deal with the Nepalese quagmire. All this, led to the erosion of the strategic autonomy of the countries of the region and made them a prey to the global systemic pressures. Thus, South Asian security dynamics has been globalized under the aura of rampant spread of different forms of anti-regime activities that intensified the fear of widespread State failure and put the democratization process into shambles.

It is in this perspective that the limitations of India's soft power must be understood. The tumultuous character of South Asian dynamics and the contested nature of India's dominance have considerably impeded the prospects of India engaging in a co-optive power behavior with its neighborhood. It has also been unable to set an agenda in the region which would be followed by all neighbors for mutual benefit. Power itself, is defined by Dahl⁴⁶ as one's ability to make others do what otherwise they would not be willing to do. Power is a dynamic phenomenon in international relations; the ability to exercise power comes from possession of certain resources such as population, territory, economic strength, technological advancement, military might and political stability. However, in assessing power in international relations today, factors such as technology, education and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population and raw material are becoming less important.⁴⁷ This change has led to categorization of power into hard and soft power. Hard power entails inducements (carrot or threats) and is exercised with the help of tangible resources such as economic and military strength. There is also an indirect exercise of power, which involves setting an agenda that others follow without any coercion. This is called co-optive power behavior. It is based on ideas and political agenda that shape the preferences of others. The sources of co-optive power behavior come from intangible resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. This dimension of power is regarded as soft power.⁴⁸

Robert Cox has elaborated the nature of soft power by using the Gramscian conception of hegemony to indicate how countries dominate the world order without the use of force. He refers to British and American domination, facilitated by the institutionalization of a liberal economic order.⁴⁹ Thus, soft power facilitates co-optive power behavior and hard power leads to command power behavior. In the light of this, we must critique the structuralist interpretation of power that has been defined by the realists and neo-realists in pure material terms.

The interests of the State and other non-State actors engaged in the dynamics of international relations are not placed in a dialectical mode of interaction, but are textured in the form of a coalitional interdependence in which the State's interest is placed in a position of paramountcy. The State here is primarily concerned in protecting its national interest, defined in terms of the inviolability of its cartographic boundaries and sovereignty. In this regard, a State's interest and its resoluteness to protect the same often tend to contest with the similar interest and resolve of other States. The politico-strategic equations of different States engaged in such contest largely depend upon their respective capabilities. This, in turn, conditions the nature of inter-State relations. Existence of balance of interests and balance of capabilities may result in the stabilization of peace among States. It also enhances the feasibility of arriving at credible deterrence in circumstances of long standing conflicts. On the other hand, competing interests leads to conflicts, even if the capabilities of States are not matched. In this situation, the credibility of defence capacities to take part in the State's endeavors to protect its interest becomes crucial. Technology has played a significant role in determining the effectiveness of States to accomplish this task. Besides, political will, regime structure characteristics, reputations, crisis bargaining behaviour and the success of military strategy, also constitute vital elements in this regard. However, balance of interests always tends to overpower the imbalance of capabilities, in situations of enduring rivalries. This implies that the capabilities’ imbalance does not prevent States with weaker capabilities to engage in conflicts because they commend balance of interests with stronger powers. This, then, brings us to the need for understanding the State-centric and military driven character of international security. Such an understanding has been part of the mainstream security studies which has been influenced by structural realism or neo realism, a dominant approach to theorize State behavior in international relations.

Neorealism or structural realism is based upon the materialist epistemology of bounded territoriality and distribution of power in its interpretation of the structure of international relations. It treats States as unitary rational and functionally undifferentiated actors, with differences only in the distribution of their capabilities. It argues that the international system molds the States and defines the possibilities of conflict and cooperation. Thus for structural realism, international security concerns are overtly Statist, having apparent military connotations. During the cold war, the concept of security mainly denoted State's security which meant that in the discourse of security studies, State was the major referent object. In the understanding of security in international politics, State was the major component.⁵⁰ Stephen P. Walt largely emphasized upon the military dimension of security and hence for him, threat of war and the requirement of military preparedness to mitigate the same were crucial for security in international politics. Thus, State's security was the most important component of security studies for Stephen Walt.⁵¹

Neorealism or structural realism largely theorized this aspect of international relations. Its essence lies in what has been called as the ‘three Ss’ which consist of State, self help and survival. It remains the most significant and widely used paradigm within the area of study described as mainstream security studies. However, neorealism hardly offers any theory of foreign policy. It is not a foreign policy paradigm, meaning that it is merely concerned with system wide attributes and its general impact on units.⁵²

If we consider structural realism of Kenneth Waltz here, it emerges essentially as a static theory of State behaviour at the systemic level, with a narrow unifocal agenda. It explains international relations by defining capabilities in military terms. Competitive behaviour and conflict may be central to States, but may be of little consequence for economically weak States. In addition to this, structural realism posits that conflicts originate from pressures of international system, totally neglecting the role of domestic structural compulsions. In most of the third world countries, domestic politics plays a vital role in engendering international conflicts. The imposition of domestic order due to competing claims for power within and regional security predicament due to contested borders became an integral part of all third world countries.⁵³

Waltz, anyhow, argues that neorealism is a comprehensive guide for foreign policy decision-making. The units behave according to the signals emanating out of the structure and their patterns of polarity, identity, alliances, which must correspond to the global distribution of capabilities. This way, Waltz totally rules out the security dilemmas of States at the sub systemic level.⁵⁴

Besides, the two defining elements of cold war had been bipolarity and nuclear weapons. Much IR theorizing in the post World War II period has been influenced by these two elements. However, these elements did not make fundamental differences to the workings of the international system and the norms of the international society. The neo-realists were merely preoccupied with the international system while defining the security predicaments. In addition to this, since questions of war and peace cannot be addressed without referring to the context in which conflicts occurs and are managed and resolved, theorizing on the basis of inadequate knowledge of the historical and geographic context may be misleading and counterproductive. In this regard, neorealism suffers from two inadequacies: Firstly, it lack data base and secondly, its claims of being scientific defies the logic of social science theorizing.⁵⁵

Neorealism came under severe attack from neoliberal institutionalists. The neorealist emphasis on defining the international system in terms of State being the sole actor, facing existential strains in an anarchical world, was countered by the neoliberal institutionalists’ argument that supra national institutions had gained primacy over the State by virtue of globalization. The proper functioning of these institutions and strict adherence to rules, for them, would facilitate in mitigating the anarchical character of the international order and stabilize democracy and peace. This meant that cooperation in world politics, leading to mutual benefit among States, can be enhanced through the construction and support of multilateral institutions. In pursuance of this, neoliberal institutionalism provides one basis of authority conceived in terms of the fusion of power and legitimate social purpose. The social purpose of institutional liberalism is to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of a more peaceful, prosperous and free world. Institutional liberalism justifies the use of power for constructing institutions on the basis of this conception of social purpose.⁵⁶

The key proponents of these ideas are the theorists of the anarchy problematique that include, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye. They understand cooperation as instrumentalist relationship and focus on situations of interdependent decision making that involves conflicting as well as complimentary interests among States. They understand that cooperation means that one or more States take decisions in such a manner that the resulting outcomes are likely to serve the interests of other States. To cooperate in international politics, in this view, means to make decisions and embark on courses of action that are advantageous for other actors.⁵⁷ In this regard, cooperation occurs when States adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of other actors.⁵⁸ Apart from this, through the concepts of complex interdependence, agenda setting, regimes and international organization, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1989) developed a critique of the stationary and anarchical character of the international structure advocated by the neo-realists. Complex interdependence involves multiple channels of communication between societies involving multiple actors and not just States, multiple issues arranged without any hierarchy and the irrelevance of the threat of force. For Keohane and Nye, in the post World War II period countries have become more and more intertwined economically. The exponential growth of the size and number of transnational organizations has blurred State boundaries, rendering the realist assumption of the centrality of the State questionable. Realists contend that State is the dominant actor in world politics and they achieve their goals in international relations through military force and violence. To counter this, Keohane and Nye provide an ideal type complex interdependence based on cooperation rather than conflict. For them, non security issues such as international monetary relations and global environmental concerns have become more important.⁵⁹

However, neoliberal institutionalism also fails to provide viable solutions to the social challenges posed by globalization. It merely offers a market based framework for conducting contemporary world politics as it speaks of linking State power with capitalism. Hence, it falls short of explaining as to how States engaged in conflicts driven by cartographic fundamentalism can build peace through economic cooperation. Above all, neoliberal institutionalism also operates within the neorealist framework as it accepts the neorealist contention that institutions can function effectively within the given structures of power and interest. In view of this, the neoliberal institutionalism as a critique of the structuralist/materialist reductionism of the neo-realists proves to be an empty purport.

In this context, the ideas of Robert Cox emerge as an alternative approach to understand the predicament of the contemporary world order. His views on the post hegemonic world order can emerge as the appropriate critique for the neorealist reductionism and its neoliberal apology. To begin with, Robert Cox substitutes the term world order to that of International Relations to describe the contemporary world politics and to negate the State centric connotations of the term international relations. According to him, the relative stability of fundamental structures during the cold war imparted certain degree of significance to the positivism and a historicity of neorealism. However, the end of cold war with heightened economic competition loosened these structures, leading to the decline in the importance of the neorealist approach. This is the time when critical theories gained ascendancy.⁶⁰ He further advocates the employment of historical materialism instead of neorealism to explain the nature of world order. For Cox, neorealism is static and synchronic and historical materialism is dynamic and diachronic. Hence, Cox seeks to explain the course of continuity and change in world politics through the use of the diachronic historical materialism, rather than the stationary perspective of neorealism.

For him, neorealism assumes that conflict arises due to the static nature of the structure and hence, the neorealist perception of world politics is also stationary in character. As neorealism assumes that structures have stationary character, State also is static, meaning that States are Trans historicized as ever present elements in world order.⁶¹ For Cox, all structures are historical and his method is designed to incorporate both the static and dynamic aspect of structures.⁶² Cox argues that the relationship between idealism to materialism is a dialectical one and both are necessary to reach the reality.⁶³ Thus, we should use the more dynamic approach of historical materialism to counter this argument. By using historical materialism, Cox argues, it may be demonstrated that conflict itself is a dynamic process and leads to structural transformation. Further, historical materialism also allows us to grasp the vertical dimension of power to the neorealist horizontal dimension of rivalry between States by constructing categories of domination-subordination, such as metropolis over the hinterland and centre over periphery.⁶⁴ Further, historical materialism expands the neorealist perspective by bringing in civil society and its relationship with the State as an additional element into international relations. Thus, State/civil society becomes a significant constituent of world politics. Finally, historical materialism examines the connection between production and power in both the State as well as international relations. Neorealism, on its part, entirely neglects the production process.⁶⁵ Historical materialism is sensitive to the dialectics in the sphere of production which could affect other spheres such as State and world order.⁶⁶

Further, the key concepts to the neorealist approach to international theory were developed by Western scholars, largely based on the analysis of the interactions among Western States. Yet, one of the paradigm's main purpose is to transcend time and space in order to recognize patterns in the recurrence of international conflicts. However, neorealism is not entirely free from ethnocentric prejudices and cultural biases because of its Western intellectual setting. In this way, it fails to transcend time and place specific values. In addition to this, it is based on subjective assumptions and therefore, limited to a specific historical and cultural realm.⁶⁷ In this regard, Robert Cox argues that there cannot be any theory that is outside a specific spatio-temporal context. Theory is always for some one and for some purpose.⁶⁸ According to him, there are two types of theories, problem solving and critical theories. Problem solving theories, of which neorealism is an example, consider the prevailing structures of the world as their given framework for action. They study the workings and impacts of the international system or address the problems it creates. Such theories not only accept the existing order as given, but also intentionally or unintentionally sustain it. Critical theories, by contrast, attempt to transcend the existing world with the objective of comprehending as to how it was created and how it could be made more peaceful.⁶⁹ Cox in this manner emerges as the key proponent of critical theory in international relations and a staunch critique of the neorealist vision of international order.

Robert Cox's contribution to international relations theory places the discipline in a transformational framework. Building upon the ideas of Gramsci, he goes beyond the neorealist State centric framework and brings out the linkage between material conditions, ideas and institutions in the formation of what he terms as world orders. By arguing that change in international relations can come from any of the following spheres, material condition, ideas and institutions, he goes beyond the base super structure model of Karl Marx.⁷⁰ Cox was largely influenced by Gramscian emphasis on both consent and coercion. As Gramsci's Marxist theory represents the assertion of absolute historicism and humanism over economic determinism, the primacy of the super structural activities over infrastructural activities, that is the base, the primacy of ideological hegemony over political hegemony and the subjective over the objective dimension in Marxist theory of history and society.

Cox picked up Gramsci's concern with the direction of hegemony in both the political and civil society, wherein for Gramsci the theoretical/practical principles of hegemony both have epistemological significance.⁷¹ Hegemony, on its part, is not merely exercise of coercive force; it is fundamentally a transcendental power to consensually impose authority. It is primarily a cultural and ideological phenomenon, reflecting human consciousness and only secondarily, is a political fact. Further, it also means that to exercise class domination, it may not be necessary to control the forces of production in the Marxian sense. Control over the super structural elements, allows the dominant class to extend their control even to the base. This also lends into the Gramscian interpretation of the State which is very much different from the classical Marxists. State, for Gramsci, is not a monolithic entity and represents a combination of two inter-dependent components: political society and civil society, meaning that hegemony is protected by coercion,⁷² or it is dictatorship + hegemony.⁷³

In the same way, unlike Marx⁷⁴ for whom, civil society was an ensemble of economic relations, for Gramsci,⁷⁵ it is an ideological superstructure. Gramsci, thus, did not entirely minimize the importance of the infrastructure. Anyhow unlike Marx, for Gramsci, the base is not the primary and determining factor of the superstructure. Rather, it is secondary and determined by super structural elements.⁷⁶ So, the relationship between the base and superstructure is one of means and end.

Further, Cox was significantly influenced by the Hungarian intellectual Karl Polanyi. Karl Polanyi's book The Great Transformation is regarded as one of the most celebrated works on globalization and international political economy. It was a critique of liberal thought, specifically of Ricardian political economy. Karl Polanyi adopted a Hegelianised Marxist approach to evolve his notion of embeddedness which means a socially embedded economy.⁷⁷ The great depression leading to the collapse of the global economy and fascism had a major impact on his work. Influenced by this, Polanyi talked about industrial capitalism's socially divisive impact on community life which he called as the civilizational crisis. According to him, the atomizing of society led to the domination of market. Thus, for him, institutions must shape individual preferences, rather than it being the other way round. Hence, Polanyi talked of building a market society which for him, begins with the disembodying of the market economy. He showed that the nonmarket economies based on social considerations and not the concerns of the market, were socially controlled and embedded in kinship and political organization. They were also organized to express moral and religious obligation.⁷⁸ Inspired by Karl Polanyi's work Great Transformation, Cox states that social globalization would be a response to hyper liberalism characterized by unrestrained market. As a solution to the challenge of globalization and hyper liberalism, Robert Cox attempts at portraying the picture of a post hegemonic world order on the basis of the ideas of the Arab historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun. He picks up his ideas of macro societies and super inter-subjectivity.⁷⁹ In view of this, Cox considers globalization as a factor bringing change. This globalization would be embedded in society and not market.⁸⁰

For Cox, State is only one among the crucial multiple components of the world order and unlike the neo-realists, he accented upon the importance of the internal characteristics of States in shaping the nature of world order.⁸¹ Civil society within a State, for Cox, forms one significant aspect of this phenomenon. Like Gramsci, Cox also believed in the strengthening of the civil society for imparting change in world politics.

Further, Cox speaks of the emergence of a transnational class as a result of the internationalization of production that leads to the internationalization of the State. This class not only consists of the executives of transnational corporations and international agencies, but also those who manage these internationally oriented sectors within the countries such as members of the finance ministries and local managers in the international production process. There are three components involved in this process.⁸² Firstly, there is a process of interstate consensus formation regarding the needs and requirements of the world economy that takes place within a common ideological framework. Second, participation in this consensus formation is hierarchically structured. Thirdly, the internal structure of the State is adjusted so that each can best transform the global consensus into national policy and practice.⁸³ Cox proposes a three dimensional strategy indicating the new pattern of hegemony. They include, a hegemony based on coalition, a non hegemony by a return to neo-mercantilist nation-focused production and counter-hegemony through the coalition of the third world countries.⁸⁴ Cox envisages the counter-hegemonic movement to globalization led by groups consisting of women, environmentalists, peace activists, indigenous people, trade unions and churches. Thus, the existing globalization, driven by the economic logic, would be countered by a new globalization embedded in the society.⁸⁵ Cox, in this way, delineates a path for counter hegemony against globalization. It involves the strengthening of civil society, constructing a plural world order with postmodernist leanings, moving towards participatory democracy, new social movements, multilateralism and nonviolent means of solving conflicts.⁸⁶

A reading of the ideas of Robert Cox indicates that for India, the most promising strategy would be a primary focus on building up its position in South Asia based on cooperation with its neighbors. Regional politics is increasingly becoming significant in international relations. But as long as India remains at odds with its immediate neighbors and is unable to organize the region into an effective unit in an international constellation, South Asian voices would not be heard with much respect. South Asia offers excellent opportunities to India for trade, investment and water management, but these can be realized only in an environment of trust and confidence among the nations of the region.⁸⁷

A cursory look at the chequered history of South Asia indicates that Indian engagement in the region has largely been influenced by its strategic interests. Due to this, a cohesive region that can take advantage of the diverse opportunities thrown up by the changing socio-economic and cultural scenario that has been engendered by globalization has been impossible. India, with its multilayered connections with diverse stakeholders of the globalized world can be an ideal window for the region to integrate itself into the dynamic structures of the globalized world. In terms of global capabilities, South Asia still needs to pick up itself to be able to compete with the rapidly changing economic system. Hence, the need here for India is to advance more liberal policies in the form of liberal visa regimes, opening up of its markets for the traders of other South Asian neighbors and funding of the industrial and infrastructural growth of the South Asian States. So comradeship, rather than a hegemonic dispensation is the key for the success of India's regional policy in South Asia. This comradeship would be based upon the cooperative interface between the States, civil society, industry and people of the region which could chart a post hegemonic order in the region. Coxian model of social globalization would also reach a fruition point if India engages in an endeavor to take full advantage of its soft power to reach this objective.

India has to adopt the Coxian framework for devising a strategy for the maximum utility of its soft power in the interest of the region. Only by demonstrating a magnanimous approach in terms of extending cooperation to its neighbors in the spheres of economic production, infrastructural progress, market for the goods of the less developed economies and assistance in the development of the units in the services sector of the neighbors such as education, health, banking and social security that India can evolve a cooperative and friendly policy for South Asia.

In view of this, it may be stated that PM Modi has been a staunch advocate of the BRICS Bank; India should also contemplate on a South Asian development bank. In the field of education, South Asian University (SAARC University) has been a wonderful step toward the exercise of India's soft power for the betterment of the region. However, India has a large network of good quality universities run by both the central as well as the State Governments, apart from the IITs, IIMs, IIITs and NIIITs. Provisions must be made in terms of a kind of exchange programmes and quota system for the students of the lesser developed economies in the region to come and study in these institutions. India can also contribute to the development of elementary education by extending such facilities in its vast network of schools. In the health sector, India can offer subsidized health services for the treatment of major diseases in its super specialty hospitals. Overall, India's soft power, hitherto exercised in a very limited manner has to be put for maximum usage, keeping in view the developmental agenda of South Asia for a prosperous future.

On the basis of the conceptual triangulation elaborated here, the paper has argued that the neorealist and neoliberal approaches are plagued by methodological reductionism and makes a case towards adopting the ideas of Robert Cox as epistemological tools to understand the emerging world order. Both the neorealist and the neoliberal institutionalist reaffirm the structuralist/materialist logic employed in defining the nature of the world order. They totally neglect the non-materialist/non-structural factors that deeply influence the functioning of world politics. Besides, the neoliberal institutionalists merely succeeded in substituting the realist notion of an anarchical international order wherein, States compete for survival without any hierarchal authority for protection, with, their own belief in a pattern of world politics, governed by an open market competition, guided by liberal institutions, adhering to a set of rules. Thus, neoliberal institutionalists tended to follow the framework of an international structure of the neorealist model. This replica model envisaged a world order wherein the capabilities of the States as the substructures of the broader international structure become important for their survival in a competitive environment in which the structure itself is governed by the ordering principles of the market.

Robert Cox's emphasis on the notion of a counter globalization, based on basic human needs and a humane agenda for constructing a just and equitable social order, can be regarded as an apt critique of the State centricism of neorealism and the over determinism of international institutions by the neoliberal institutionalists. Cox's critical theory places the weakest sections of the society at the core in presenting a solution to the challenge posed by hyper liberalism. Cox's approach also goes beyond ethnocentrism and cultural biases inherent in neorealism and represents as an explanatory tool characterized by methodological agnosticism. This paper has made a case towards adopting the ideas of Robert Cox, as epistemological tool for understanding the place of India's neighborhood policy in an emerging world order prevalent under globalization.

Situating the analysis in the context of the major debates in the discipline of international relations, the paper has conducted an epistemological enquiry into the ontological foundations of India's strategies and approach in South Asia. This has been done by laying focus on the transformative power of globalization and its ability to shape the contours of the new world order. On the basis of this, the paper has argued that India has exhibited inability to take advantage of this emergent force, through the capacity of its multifaceted soft power credentials. This incapability, on the part of India as argued in this paper has been represented by the failure of its regional policy in South Asia.

Reference